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Abstract
The early characterization of humans as narrowly self-interested agents has unraveled in 
recent decades due to advances in the behavioral sciences. There is convincing evidence 
that peoples’ preferences and decisions are shaped by their relationship with others and 
the context of their interactions. While previous studies have demonstrated that context 
can shape preferences, we consider whether people endogenously shape their own 
preferences by choosing their context. Using a one-shot game, we explore whether 
dictators actively seek or avoid information regarding the deservingness of their 
recipient. We find that four out of five dictators endogenously choose to close the social 
distance gap by finding out the deservingness level of their recipients, and they act on 
that frame –the deserving get more, the un-deserving get less. We further show that the 
decision to seek more information about the recipient is systematic, explained by the 
cultural worldviews of the dictator.
Todd L. Cherry, Linda Thunström, David M. McEvoy, & Jason F. Shogren (2016) "Endogenous 
Context In A Dictator Game" Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics  Vol. 65  pp. 117-120 
Version of Record Available From (www.sciencedirect.com)
Be careful the environment you choose for it will shape you. 
– D. Clement Stone
1. Introduction
John Stuart Mill’s early characterization of humans as nar- 
rowly self-interested agents is a valuable precept of neoclassi- 
cal economic theory, a simplifying starting point that has served 
economists well when modeling individual behavior ( Persky, 1995 ). 
Research from the behavioral sciences however has provided con- 
siderable evidence that our interests are more nuanced than the 
presumption, with preferences being shaped by our relationship 
with others and the context of our interactions (e.g., see Tversky 
and Simonson, 1993 ). How context shapes preferences matters be- 
cause it follows that standard welfare measures used in policy 
analyses are transient artifacts contingent on context. The efficacy 
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t of policy analysis therefore can benefit from a better understand-
ing of the interplay between context and preferences. Herein we
contribute to this effort by exploring the notion that context and
social preferences are endogenous choices rather than exogenous
determinants. While previous studies find that context can shape
preferences, we consider whether people endogenously shape thei
own preferences by choosing their context. 1 
Following the literature, we use a variant of the dictator gam
to show that context about the recipient deservingness affects dic-
tator behavior (e.g., Engel, 2011; Cherry and Shogren, 2008 ). We
extend this finding to explore whether dictators actively seek or
avoid a richer context about recipient deservingness—context that
may be costly to the dictator. If they choose to avoid knowing
about recipient deservingness, dictators are choosing to maintain
social distance—hiding from the more demanding context. But if
dictators choose to know recipient deservingness, they act to close
the social distance gap. They want to draw upon the more persona
context, be less homo economicus and more human. 
Our study connects two strands of the dictator game literatur
First, to identify a robust non-material context that shapes other
regarding behavior, we draw from the deservingness literature thashows dictators show more generosity to more deserving recipi- 
ents (e.g., Engel, 2011; Cherry and Shogren, 2008 ). And second, we 
introduce endogeneity by following the strategic or willful igno- 
rance literature that shows dictators often justify maximizing their 
own payoffs by avoiding information about how their actions may 
1 We note that other studies have considered the endogenous selection of poli- 
cies, institutions and group membership (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009; Sutter et al., 2010;
Cherry et al., 2014; Gürerk, 2014 ).
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t  lower the payoffs of recipients (e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Feiler, 2014 ).
The resulting framework allows us to examine whether dictators
choose to maintain or reduce the social distance of recipients, and
therefore choose the context that shapes their social preferences. 
Our results reveal that 4 of 5 dictators choose to close the social
distance gap—they choose to be more human, though not always
more humane. The majority chose to know about the deserving-
ness of the recipient, and they acted on that frame—the deserv-
ing get more, the undeserving get less. We verify the decision to
close the social distance gap is systematic, explained by the cul-
tural worldviews of the dictator. 
2. The experiment
The experimental design is based on a one-shot anonymous
dictator game. The absence of strategic concerns makes the dicta-
tor game a useful framework to examine other-regarding behavior
(see, e.g., Hoffman et al., 1996 ). When recruited, subjects were as-
signed to group A (dictators) or B (recipients). The two groups did
not have any contact before, during, or after the session. Subjects
were randomly matched across groups to form pairs. The dictators
decided how to split $10 with their randomly matched recipient.
To make an offer, dictators had three minutes to open a sealed en-
velope, fill out the enclosed decision card, and place the completed
decision card back in the envelope. Dictators were called one by
one to exit the room, taking their envelope to a station outside the
room to receive their payment ($10 minus the offer). Administra-
tors delivered the offers along with a copy of the instructions to
the recipient (available on request). 2 
Our 3 ×2 design varies two treatment variables in the basic dic-
tator game framework—recipient deservingness (high, low or uncer-
tain) and information origin (exogenous or endogenous). 
2.1. Recipient deservingness 
To vary recipient deservingness in the eyes of dictators, we ex-
ploit differences in the investment that recipients make in partic-
ipating in the study. Prior to making offers, dictators knew they
were matched with a recipient that either: accepted the invita-
tion to participate and showed up to different rooms at different
times ( high ), rejected the invitation to participate but were identi-
fied from those individuals in the recruiting database that received
an invitation but did not attempt to register for the experiment
( low ), or was equally likely to have accepted or rejected the invita-
tion to participate ( uncertain ). Similar information about recipients
is used in Cherry and Shogren (2008) and they find that this mea-
sure of deservingness significantly influences dictators’ behavior.
Note that we are drawing from this literature to replicate a context
that has previously established the importance of other-regarding
preferences in decision making. From this, we construct a setting
that allows dictators the choice of their context and therefore their
social preferences. 3 
Note that all dictators were informed that the distribution of
recipients were equally split between high and low types, but only
dictators in the high and low treatments knew the deservingness
of their recipient. Deservingness levels were not revealed to dicta-
tors in the uncertain treatment. 2 In Grossman (2014) and Dana et al. (2007) , dictators choose between two op- 
tions that split different or uncertain total amounts.
3 Other social distance contexts from the literature would be plausible, such as
reducing anonymity by revealing a person’s family name ( Charness and Gneezy,
2008 ).
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.2. Information origin 
Recipient deservingness was revealed to dictators in one of two
ays—exogenous or endogenous . In the exogenous treatments, the
nstructions informed dictators about the deservingness of their re-
ipient. In one treatment dictators were informed that the Player B
hey were matched with accepted the invitation to participate and
howed up (in another room) on time ( exogenous-high ). In another
reatment, the dictators were informed that their recipient was in-
ited to participate but rejected the invitation ( exogenous-low ), and
n a third treatment the dictators were uncertain about the partic-
pation decision of the recipients but, like in all treatments, knew
he distribution was equally split ( exogenous-uncertain ). This cre-
ted three treatments which correspond to Cherry and Shogren
2008) . We extend this design to allow dictators the choice to
now or avoid information about recipient deservingness. 
In the endogenous treatment, dictators made an active decision
hether to learn about the participation decision of their recip-
ents. To facilitate this, in each endogenous information session,
ictators were provided with two envelopes. An envelope labeled
INFO” contained a decision card that included information on the
ecipient’s participation decision, while the decision card in the en-
elope marked “NO INFO” did not reveal the recipient’s participa-
ion decision. Specifically, the dictators’ instructions stated: 
• If you want to learn about Player B, open the envelope labeled
INFO. Fill out the decision card and place it back in the enve-
lope.
• If you do not want to learn about Player B, you must open the
envelope labeled NO INFO. Fill out the decision card and place
it back in the envelope.
Dictators could only open one envelope to make an offer. 4 If
ictators chose to learn recipient deservingness, the split was cat-
gorized as either endogenous-high or endogenous-low , each with
 50-50 likelihood. If dictators chose to not learn about the recipi-
nt deservingness, the split was placed in the endogenous-uncertain
ase. The exogenous treatments replicate previous studies that
how recipient deservingness influences dictator offers (e.g., Cherry
nd Shogren 2008 ). The endogenous treatments extend the design
o consider whether dictators choose to be ignorant about recipi-
nt deservingness. 
.3. Worldviews 
To explore whether dictator behavior is random or systematic,
e elicit the individual worldviews of dictators as possible deter-
inants of seeking or avoiding additional context. After the split,
ictators completed a survey that elicited their cultural world-
iews. We follow the literature by using the short-form instru-
ent from Kahan et al. (2011) . Dictators used a six-level Likert
cale to indicate their (dis)agreement to two sets of six statements
1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree). One set of statements
aptures hierarchy-egalitarianism worldviews: “attitudes toward
ocial orderings that connect authority to stratified social roles
ased on highly conspicuous and largely fixed characteristics such
s gender, race, and class” (p. 51, Kahan et al., 2011 ). Another set of
tatements captures individualism-communitarianism worldviews:
attitudes toward social orderings that expect individuals to secure
heir own well-being without assistance or interference from soci-
ty versus those that assign society the obligation to secure collec-
ive welfare and the power to override competing individual inter-
sts” (p. 51, Kahan et al., 2011 ). The sum of scores for each set of4 This no-default design feature follows Larson and Capra (2009) and Grossman
2014) , which show that default settings to show that default options on informa- 
ion significantly affect dictator behavior.
Table 1
Summary statistics by deservingness and origin of information.
Information source Chose information? Recipient deservingness Mean offer N
Exogenous
n.a. High $3 .17 45
Low $1 .14 44
n.a. Uncertain $2 .75 45
Total $2 .36 134
Endogenous
Yes 79% High $4 .47 51
Low $0 .74 62
No 21% Uncertain $2 .03 30
Total $2 .34 143
Pooled $2 .38 277
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7 Despite differences in the content and cost of the information, Grossman
(2014) finds a similar rate (75%) of dictators opting for information about recipient
payoffs. Unlike Grossman (2014) and this study, Dana et al. (2007) sets no informa- 
tion as the default option and finds fewer dictators opting for information (56%).tatements, which can range from 6 to 36, places the individual’s
iews along the spectrum of the corresponding worldviews. Higher
ierarchy scores indicate worldviews that are more hierarchal (less
galitarian), while higher individualism scores indicate worldviews
hat are more individualistic (less communitarian). 
.4. Protocol 
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Appalachian
xperimental Economics Laboratory at Appalachian State Univer-
ity. Participants were recruited from the general undergraduate
nd graduate student population using the Online Recruiting Sys-
em for Experimental Economics (ORSEE). In total, 554 people par-
icipated in one of 16 sessions, generating 277 independent splits.
he experimental sessions lasted about 25 minutes. 5 
We note that the results from laboratory experiments some-
imes come with questions of external validity (e.g., Sear, 1986 ).
owever, considerable evidence indicates that behavior, and in par-
icular comparative static results, is quite consistent across the lab
nd field (e.g., Chermak et al., 2013; Alm et al., 2015 ). In particular,
xadaktylos et al. (2013) find subject behavior in economic games,
uch as the dictator game, corresponds closely to the general pop-
lation. 
. Results
.1. Deservingness 
We first confirm that recipient deservingness matters to dicta-
ors’ social preferences. From Table 1 , results from the exogenous
reatments reveal that deservingness significantly influences dicta-
or behavior. Compared to the exogenous-uncertain treatment, dic-
ators make significantly higher average offers to high deserving
ecipients and significantly lower offers to low deserving recipi-
nts ($3.17 vs. $2.75, p < 0.01; $1.14 vs. $2.75, p < 0.01). 6 Our re-
ults closely match those reported in Cherry and Shogren (2008) .
n their three treatments with $10 windfall endowments, they find
hat on average the high deserving receive $3.47, the low deserv-
ng $1.12 and the uncertain $2.41. Our result is also qualitatively
onsistent with Eckel and Grossman’s (1996) finding that dictators
ffer higher amounts to established charities (the more deserving)
ompared to anonymous students (the less deserving). 
.2. Ignorance 
We now examine whether dictators will actively seek or avoid
he potentially costly context of deservingness. Results from the5 Instructions are available upon request.
6 The p -values reported are from two sample t tests.
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ndogenous treatments show that, when given the chance to opt
ut, only about 1 in 5 dictators do so. Most dictators, about 4 in
, choose to know about recipient deservingness—they choose to
lose social distance and have their social preferences shaped by
he more personal context. This finding suggests that context is not
ecessarily an exogenous determinant of social preferences; rather
t is a systematic choice that endogenously shapes social prefer-
nces. 7 
Note, from Table 1 , dictator offers are consistent across endoge-
ous and exogenous treatments. In aggregate, there is no signifi-
ant difference in the mean offer: $2.36 vs. $2.34 ( p = 0.934), and
imilar patterns emerge when stratifying by deservingness treat-
ents. 
.3. Worldviews 
To verify that dictator behavior is not random, we consider how
ndividual worldviews systematically explain the choice to close
ocial distance. We estimate two linear probability models that
egress the two dictator decisions—to know the recipient’s deserv-
ngness ( opt-in ) and the amount offered ( offer )—on the two world-
iew measures ( hierarchy and individualism ). Estimating the opt-in
odel (first column in Table 2 ) reveals that worldviews signifi-
antly affects this choice—the likelihood of choosing to know the
eservingness of the recipient is significantly higher among dicta-
ors with more egalitarian (less hierarchal) or more communitarian
less individualistic) worldviews or both. 
An additional set of models reveals that worldviews have no
ignificant influence on the amount offered by the dictator. This
nding is robust for the pooled model and when estimating the
odel using data stratified by treatment variables and dictator opt-
n choice ( Table 2 ). While worldviews affect dictators’ decision to
now about the recipient’s condition, it is what they learn about
eservingness rather than their worldviews that affects the offer. 8 
. Concluding remarks
Do dictators choose to learn more about the context implied by
he deservingness of their recipients? Yes—we find 4 of 5 dicta-
ors want more context, not less. They actively chose to know the
eservingness of the recipient, and they acted on it—giving more8 The endogenous choice of context introduces additional nuances for our un- 
erstanding of moral self-regulation, which considers moral licensing and moral
leansing (see Brañas-Garza et al. 2013, Sachdeva et al., 2009 ). In choosing context,
eople are more capable of justifying future actions.
Table 2
Dictator behavior and cultural worldviews.
Opt-in Offer
Pooled No option Option
Opt-out Opt-in-high Opt-in-low
Intercept 1 .429 3 .372 3 .155 –1 .698 4 .210 1 .720
(0 .0 0 0) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .484) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .124)
Hierarchy –0 .029 –0 .031 –0 .039 0 .269 0 .077 –0 .030
(0 .014) (0 .557) (0 .608) (0 .081) (0 .278) (0 .733)
Individualism –0 .025 –0 .062 –0 .030 –0 .010 –0 .069 –0 .059
(0 .010) (0 .143) (0 .614) (0 .937) (0 .238) (0 .390)
F 9 .78 1 .62 0 .32 1 .69 1 .11 0 .61
(0 .0 0 0) (0 .0 0 0) (0 .724) (0 .203) (0 .339) (0 .545)
N 143 277 134 30 51 62
Notes: p -values in parentheses.
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S  money to the deserving, and less to the underserving. Choosing the
richer context was systematic, explained by the dictators’ cultural
worldviews. Rather than hiding from potentially taxing context,
these dictators choose to close the social distance—they choose
to let their preferences be shaped by the human condition of
the recipient. They choose to be more human and less homo eco-
nomicus . 
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